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Abstract
Existing scholarship on postcolonial urbanisms has judiciously analysed the role played by the state and private capital in
the expansion of global information-technology clusters and exclusive high-tech knowledge enclaves that have emerged
across different metropolitan fringes in India and in the wider global South. However, much of this scholarship has focused
primarily on the antagonisms wrought by the ‘expulsion’ of local rural populations from their lands and livelihoods, at the
hands of the neoliberal state and global capitalist elites. In contrast, there is not enough research on how diverse local com-
munities and subaltern actors emerge in place, and help organise, support and sustain thesemodern infrastructural spaces
well after the initial moment of their establishment. Citing this important gap in our knowledge, this article argues for the
need to move beyond some of the adversarial accounts associated with the overarching logics of postcolonial capitalist
accumulation and new suburban development in the global South, to focus instead on the complex ‘afterlives’ of these
modern high-tech suburban spaces. Drawing on ethnographic data from Pune city in Western India, and an emerging IT
and IT-enabled services (IT and ITeS) outsourcing hub, the article reveals that contrary to popular perceptions of high-tech
clusters as sovereign spaces for transnational capital, these sites are, in fact, constitutive of theirmultiple ‘outsides’—which
include diverse forms of informal and illegal economies and labour. To evidence these claims, the article highlights different
examples of ‘urban co-dependencies’ which have in situ emerged in Pune’s new urban fringes, to meet the growing gaps
in demand of essential public services in these areas. The article then proceeds to show how Pune’s local micro-political
cultures, including the numerous instances of territorial conflict and collaboration between so-called elites and subaltern
actors at the local level, continue to ‘co-shape’ the typologies and the temporalities of local land use, planning and devel-
opment that takes place in India’s new urban fringes.
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1. Introduction
Recent scholarship on digital geographies addressing
the growing pervasiveness of ‘the digital’ in everyday
life has come to acknowledge the need to expand its
focus from digital objects and subjects towards a broad-
er understanding of its mediation by social power rela-
tionships and inequalities “along lines of race, gender,
class, sexuality, age, etc.” (Elwood & Leszczynski, 2018,
p. 630). Thus, apart from exploring material infrastruc-
tures that enable digital practices and specific kinds of
data and knowledge production, conversations on dig-
ital geographies increasingly include “the spacetimes
and socio-spatial relations produced through increas-
ing digital mediations of everyday life” (Leszczynski &
Elwood, 2018, p. 631; Shelton, Poorthius, & Zook, 2015).
These conversations have, in turn, led to new concep-
tualisations of the contemporary city through its ‘digi-
tal skin’ (Rabari & Storper, 2015), understood not just
through cities’ physical infrastructures, but also through
“their social and material forms, component resources,
and as sites of creation and disposal” (Ash, Kitchin,
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& Leszczynski, 2018, p. 28; also see Lepawsky, 2014;
Zook, 2005).
This article attempts to further expand the discussion
on contemporary digital geographies by exploring the
interaction ofmodern digital infrastructureswith uneven
urban development and planning in cities of the global
South. At the centre of its enquiry are the IT/IT-enabled
services (ITeS) sector oriented high-tech clusters in Pune
city, an emerging tier-two metropolis, near Mumbai in
Western India. These high-tech clusters contain numer-
ous large technology parks or knowledge enclaves,which
have become hotspots for the IT and ITeS outsourcing in
the region. Over time, these clusters have seen new com-
mercial and residential developments around them, con-
siderably altering the wider landscape of the city’s subur-
ban fringes.
The rise of high-tech urban clusters in India has
been associated with post-economic liberalisation poli-
cies that permitted the state—and later private compa-
nies, as well as public–private partnership ventures—to
punitively acquire large tracts of land from peri-urban
and rural communities and facilitate the establishment of
special economic zones and export processing zoneswith
world-class, modern amenities, infrastructural facilities
and substantial regulatory and tax concessions (Chatterji,
2013; Cowan, 2018, p. 1247). The primary aim behind
the establishment of these large, fortified infrastructural
spaces was to attract new foreign capital investment in
the metropolitan fringes and satellite towns, “providing
an internationally competitive and hassle free environ-
ment for exports of goods and services” (Topno, 2005,
para. 1), insulating it from the quagmire of statutory reg-
ulations and interruptions to everyday life outside.
Ayona Datta (2015), writing on new smart-city devel-
opments in India,mentions thatmodern high-tech infras-
tructural urbanisation in India can be uniquely under-
stood in two interlinked phenomena: First, as the con-
tinuation of an earlier project of postcolonial modernisa-
tion of the Indian state, aimed at creating self-contained
or autonomous towns (Kalia, 1990) and, second, as the
outcome of the “global phenomena of privatisation of
urban spaces” (Hogan, Bunnell, Pow, Permanasari, &
Sirat, 2012, p. 59), broadly associated with the advent
of postcolonial urbanism and new models of neoliberal
urban governance (Robinson, 2014; Roy & Ong, 2011)
that idolise globally integrated but locally disarticulat-
ed ‘archipelago economies’ (Veltz, 2000), as key sites
of new economic growth in developing nations such as
India. Both explanations highlight the growing domina-
tion of postcolonial capital and transnational elites in
urban planning and development and their role in pro-
ducing hyper-exclusionary and unequal landscapes of
new urban India through the violent displacement and
dispossession of local landholding classes and of landless
labour communities (Cowan, 2018; Sanyal, 2007).
Rather than tracing the genealogy of new high-
tech urban clusters in suburban India and their evolu-
tion into private enclaves of globalisation, this article
instead conceptualises them as spaces that are consti-
tutive of “a multiplicity of normative orders” (Mezzadra
& Neilson, 2019, p. 152). In other words, instead of
viewing high-tech urban clusters as sovereign econom-
ic enclaves, free from techno-bureaucratic interruptions
and “‘annoyances’ of everyday urban life” (Datta, 2015,
p. 4), this article identifies them as spaces of global pro-
duction and exchange that are, nonetheless,mediated by
local economies, infrastructural services and actors with
varying degrees of formality, legality and permanence.
In doing so, the article emphasises the need to emplace
these new urban infrastructural spaces within notions of
urban co-dependencies that emerge in place, and that
get moulded by spatial contestations and collaborations
between different elite and subaltern urban actors.
The structure of the article is as follows. The
next section reviews the conceptual literature relating
to IT-oriented urbanisation in India’s megacity fringes,
specifically focussing on the overarching class (capital-
ist vs. agrarian) and spatial (global vs. local) binaries
that frame some of the key discussions in literature on
postcolonial urbanisation in India and the wider glob-
al South. The section argues for the need to move
beyond these binaries, to explore the vibrant afterlives
of high-tech suburban clusters by understanding and
exploring their continuous co-shaping by diverse, yet
co-dependent local economies, infrastructures and civic
and political actors. In the third section, the article intro-
duces the reader to Pune city and its transforming subur-
ban context in which this research is rooted. The fourth
section, comprising of the first key discussion segment of
this article, illustrates the various dimensions of Pune’s
IT/ITeS-oriented new suburban growth and its increas-
ing dependence on the different forms of informal and
illegal (shadow or grey) economies in the city, in the
context of local access to various basic infrastructural-
services such as transport, housing, water and food. This
section finds that these diverse economies have become
a huge and indispensable part of the city’s fabric, estab-
lishing urban co-dependencies that are integral to the
sustenance, growth and transformation of new infras-
tructural spaces in the city’s fringes. The fifth section
delves into the various urban actors and interest groups
involved in the different territorial negotiations, contes-
tations and collaborations in Pune’s new urban fringes.
Through different examples, this section highlights how
the establishment of high-tech clusters has transformed
the modes of everyday participation for these actors,
with predictable intra-class and less predictable cross-
class coalitions emerging locally in the context of these
new spaces. The article then summarises the key conclu-
sions based on the discussion.
2. IT-Oriented Urbanisation in India and
Its Contradictions
Existing discussions on the rise of new IT-oriented urban
development in India’s metropolitan fringes encom-
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pass two inter-connected antinomies that are hotly
debated. One underscores the movement from public-
focused to private-led urban planning in these ‘emer-
gent’ spaces (Chatterji, 2015), while this highlights the
relative sovereignty of these new infrastructural spaces
fringes, from local social, bureaucratic and democratic
constrains (McFarlane, 2010). Both sets of discussions
emphasise the emergence of the overarching logics of
mainstream global urbanism ‘from above’ in the glob-
al South, which “organise urban development around
neoliberal norms” (Sheppard et al., 2015, p. 1947), and
ultimately produce new socio-spatial divisions in the
local context, layered over earlier ones.
2.1. Emergent ‘High-Tech Clusters’ and Bipolar Spatial
Development: Of Gurgaon and Beyond
A common example from India, often cited in liter-
ature, that amalgamates both antinomies associated
with neoliberal suburban development, is Gurgaon—
the country’s foremost ‘millennium city’ and IT/ITeS
exports hub, located just outside the national capital of
Delhi. Gurgaonwas primarily developed by large, private-
sector investment companies with the help of the state;
this was during the new “property development-led
laissez-faire regime of urban development” (Chatterji,
2015, p. 165) in the economic liberalisation era that
began in the early 1990s. This meant that while pri-
vate planning was given a dominant role in urban devel-
opment, public and participatory modes of planning in
new suburban fringes were missing, or an afterthought
at best. This stood in contrast to established cores
of India’s metropolitan cities, where planning contin-
ued to be largely the prerogative of the state and its
local, decentralised institutions of urban governance
(Goldstein, 2016). Today, Gurgaon’smany IT-park clusters
and associated commercial and luxury housing blocks
are viewed as futuristic private islands, situated amidst
the proverbial sea of vacant agricultural lands and rus-
tic urban villages with poor public infrastructural access,
and communities which have been left without prop-
er compensation or decent jobs and livelihood oppor-
tunities. This ‘bipolarity’ in Gurgaon’s spatial develop-
ment is further evidenced by the fact that while it has
achieved global recognition as one of the top destina-
tions for the internationally offshored IT/ITeS services in
the world, it nevertheless continues to bear the repu-
tation of being a dystopic ‘badland’—plagued by high
levels of lawlessness and criminality outside the forti-
fied and surveilled spaces of its private commercial and
residential enclaves (Kuldova, 2017). This evident con-
trast in Gurgaon’s socio-spatial landscape tell the sordid
narrative associated with the post-liberalisation develop-
ment thrust of Indian state on the development of large
export-oriented industrial zones and infrastructure cor-
ridors, specifically in the megacity fringes. This resulted
in: (1) The changing role of the state from a key mediato-
ry institution for land acquisition and development to an
extractive and regulatory one; (2) the transformation of
private real-estate capital from an opportunistic actor in
urban development to a predatory one, driven by specu-
lative financial investment; and (3) the violent disposses-
sion and displacement of local land-owning communities
from their land, leaving them without fair compensation
or long-term, sustainable livelihood opportunities.
Gurgaon’s lopsided development trajectory thus
appears to be the outcome—an extreme case of what
scholars have also referred to as the ‘postcolonial
urbanisms’ in the global South (Roy&Ong, 2011), though
onebased in the peculiar expansionof the global transna-
tional IT/ITeS sector, which significantly outpaces the
sluggish industrial growth in the region. Unique as it
may be, Gurgaon is certainly not an isolated case of the
IT-oriented urbanisation in India. Indeed, the city serves
as an important case example for wider IT-oriented sub-
urban transformation in post-liberalisation India, whose
growth trajectory can be both partially and extensively
traced in contemporaneous development of other urban
metropolitan fringes and satellite towns in India, albeit
adjusted for subnational variations in their scope, scale
and speed (Chatterji, 2015; Yardley, 2011).
Another somewhat skewed depiction of high-tech
clusters or zones in urban India and the wider global
South relates to those that depict them as self-contained
and autonomous global knowledge enclaves. In differ-
ent studies, the relative autonomy and independence of
these sites is ascribed to processes including: the uni-
versal development of the global economy and urban
capital (Brenner & Schmid, 2014); the manifestation
of global ‘cookie-cutter neoliberal urbanism’ (Garrett,
2015) and/or the urban boosterist imagination borne
out of ‘extrastatecraft’ (Easterling, 2014), which acknowl-
edges multiple forces within and outside the state with
“the considerable power and administrative authority
necessary to undertake the building of infrastructure”
(Easterling, 2012, p. 2). All the above emphasise the
phenomenon of trans-local emulation of new urban
development projects that aims to remove the (nega-
tive) externalities or interruptions associated with wider,
uneven infrastructural provisioning, mundane regulato-
ry and democratic pressures, as well as societal disrup-
tions and unrest that afflict their deemed ‘outsides’ (see
McFarlane, 2011; Odendaal, 2016; Roy, 2009). These
narratives suggest that new high-tech agglomerations
in suburban India are insulated from bottom-up con-
straints, local social relationships, and grassroots democ-
racy. Together, such grand narratives of neoliberal urban-
isation work to portray high-tech clusters as sites of
sovereign exception (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2019) that oper-
ate exclusively in service of the networked global econo-
my, but are disarticulated from their immediate environ-
ments, including from diverse local economies, forms of
labour and micro-political cultures.
Though greatly informative, existing discussions
about the development of new, large-scale, IT-oriented
urban infrastructure—in the context of India’s postcolo-
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nial modernisations project and/or its post-liberalisation
pathways—provide a partial picture of the phenomena,
in so far as they fail tomove their focus beyond the initial
and violent moment of the establishment of the spaces
and the ensuing antagonisms between transnational cap-
italist elites and local agrarian land-owning classes—the
classic conflict between the powerful urban elites and
the excluded rural and peri-urban poor (Banerjee-Guha,
2013; Levien, 2013). The overt focus on the narratives
of capitalist accumulation by dispossession and expul-
sion undermines the complex local histories of urban
and agrarian transformations and how the different class
interests align, fuse together or just fizzle away at differ-
ent times. As Thomas Cowan (2018, p. 1245) finds in his
ethnographic study of urban transformations in Gurgaon,
the story of the millennium city is neither “one of whole-
sale agrarian transition, led by a unitary ‘carrier class’
of landowning capitalists…nor one of dispossession and
the violent expropriation of land by the state and global
capital.” Both Cowan (2018) and Goldstein (2016) stress
that the large-scale urban and industrial developments
in India’s new urban spaces such as Gurgaon have been
mediated by multiple logics of uneven and differentiat-
ed agrarian change in postcolonial contexts and the cor-
responding (unequal) distribution of cultural and polit-
ical capital between different local caste communities.
This uneven process of local development has enriched
some powerful actors (e.g., some of the traditional land-
holding caste communities of Jats and Yadavs, in case of
Gurgaon), making them important players in the urban
landmarkets, while forcing others into “petty rentiership
and speculative investments in land and property in the
city” (Cowan, 2018, p. 1247).
2.2. Beyond Expulsion: Framing the ‘Afterlives’ of
High-Tech Agglomerations in India
Diverging from overt focus of existing literature on spa-
tial and class-conflict produced by large-scale, private
sector-led, IT-oriented infrastructural development in
suburban India, this article takes a significantly different
view of these spaces. While considering the exclusion-
ary nature of the initial sovereign action involved in the
establishment of these new spaces of capital, this arti-
cle goes on to emphasise the need to move beyond, and
understand the complex ‘afterlives’ of these ‘globalised’
infrastructural spaces—through the reconfiguredmateri-
alities, changing power relationships and everydaymicro-
political cultures that scaffold them. Contrary to their
fabled depiction in studies of global urbanisms, neither
the state nor (global) capital are overarching, monolith-
ic units “that can be seized ‘outside’ ordinary social life”
(Buire, 2018, p. 2223).
Subsequently, by presenting a close, ethnograph-
ic account of IT-oriented urbanisation in India, and its
local social and political dis-intermediation, this article
attempts to redress the current gaps in urban scholar-
ship. More specifically, following Mezzadra and Neilson
(2019), this article frames high-tech clusters and consti-
tutive IT/ITes export zones in India, as containing mul-
tiple “divided and layered sovereignties” (Mezzadra &
Neilson, 2019, p. 107) and governed by an assortment of
normative orders. Thus, even when conceived as ‘elite’
and ‘exclusive’ nodes of global digital services produc-
tion, circulation and trade, high-tech clusters are con-
sidered spaces of capital that are thoroughly dependent
on their “multiple outsides” (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2019,
p. 65), that is, “labour and activity of subjects that can-
not be simply reduced to capital” (Mezzadra & Neilson,
2019, p. 70). These include “various forms of hustling,
tapping into flows, or distributive labour that spring
up, and in many cases, dominate, in situations where
capital has done its work of dispossession” (Mezzadra
& Neilson, 2019, p. 153). This approach, also further
advances Brenner,Madden andWachsmuth’s (2011) ear-
lier criticism of the comparative framework of global
(neoliberal) urbanism for its “over-reliance on trans-local
learning to explain urban change” (as cited in Datta,
2015, p. 5), since it fails to shed sufficient light on the
popular responses to such changes and the exercise of
agency by ordinary economic and political actors in the
local context (cf. Lund, 2006).
The analysis in this article is gleaned from ethno-
graphic research conducted over 18 months (October
2015–April 2017) by the author in Pune city, an estab-
lished hub of global IT and IT services exports in India,
with a population of about 3.1 million people. The arti-
cle draws on a combination of three different and over-
lappingmodes of ethnographic data collection, including:
(1) participant observations—‘deep hanging out’ (Geertz,
1998)—with young IT/ITeS workers and job aspirants
near Pune’s IT parks, office premises, homes, skilling
centres and in the suburbs; (2) analysis of media and
industry reports evidencing changing demography and
patterns of urbanisation vis-à-vis new IT infrastructural
developments in the city, as well as reports on pop-
ular territorial conflicts and associated local politics;
and (3) 105 semi-structured interviews and unstructured
interactions over the period of 18 months. The research
was conducted with a range of participants, including:
(1) IT/ITeS professionals and mid—and high-level man-
agerial staff in Pune’s tech parks; (2) low-paid allied
service workers (housekeeping staff, IT park security
guards) and other informal sector workers (taxi drivers,
makeshift restaurant owners) serving the companies,
various IT parks and knowledges parks and their work-
ers; (3) NGO workers and government consultants work-
ing on issues related to urban service delivery; (4) local
civic body representatives; and (5) local academics con-
ducting research on urbanisation in Pune.
3. Pune’s IT/ITeS-Led Transformation and Its
Suburban Expansion
Pune city is the second largest city in the western state
ofMaharashtra, afterMumbai, which amalgamates iden-
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tities from its past, present and the future: a British
colonial barrack town, a Maharashtrian cultural hub, a
thriving higher educational destination for young peo-
ple, a key automotive and engineering centre, and now
one of the leading outposts for India’s ‘global’ IT and
ITeS outsourcing operations. While each of these iden-
tities continue to shape Pune’s geography even today,
it is the IT/ITeS sector boom that has propelled the
city’s most recent urban demographic and infrastruc-
tural transformation.
Pune first saw the advent of high-tech urban clusters
when work began in 1998 on the first large-scale ‘spe-
cial economic zone,’ primarily meant for IT/ITeS exports.
This was the creation of the Rajiv Gandhi Infotech Park,
located in Hinjewadi, adjacent to Pune’s western lim-
its (Mahadevia & Parashar, 2008). The developer was
the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation,
a state-led enterprise of the Maharashtra government,
which was originally tasked with identifying and estab-
lishing key industrial clusters and export promotion
zones and corridors, including software technology
parks—providing them with requisite physical infrastruc-
tures like land, roads, water supply, etc. The Rajiv Gandhi
Infotech Park was established in collaboration with
the central government body known as the Software
Technology Parks of India, which regulates the software
technology park scheme that provided various bene-
fits to the registered units in tech parks or knowledge
enclaves, including complete foreign equity, different tax
incentives, duty-free import, duty-free indigenous pro-
curement, central sales tax reimbursement, domestic tar-
iff area entitlement, and deemed exporting. The Rajiv
Gandhi Infotech Park was followed by the establishment
of two larger IT park project developments in other parts
of the city with greater private sector investments—one
in Kharadi and the other in Talawade (Leducq, 2008).
These tech parks provided companies with high-speed
data communication, technology incubation and inno-
vation centres, network monitoring and data hosting
facilities, amongst other modern amenities and infras-
tructural services. Pune (today) has a high concentra-
tion of these large and mid-scale IT/Knowledge parks
and enclaves, that co-exist alongside new hybrid com-
mercial and residential townships. While official employ-
ment statistics for Pune’s IT/ITeS sector are not available
from either the National Association for Software and
Services Companies or the national body that overlooks
the development of new software technology parks of
India, a recent industry study quoted in local newspaper
reveals that direct employment in the IT/ITeS sector in
Pune district to be significant, at about 425,000 people
(Jadhav, 2020).
Ever since the advent of the Rajiv Gandhi Infotech
Park over two decades ago, Pune city has followed a
path of IT-infrastructure-led urban development that is
recognisable in other Indian megacities (Chatterji, 2015).
Today, it is not just Pune’s high-tech IT/ITeS clusters that
bear a changed look but, indeed, the areas surrounding
them. Where once stood urban villages, informal slum
settlements and ‘mandis’ (small agricultural markets),
there are now high-rise luxury apartment blocks, hybrid
residential-commercial complexes, smart satellite town-
ships, office towers and posh hotels. That said, unlike
Gurgaon, which was designated as a so-called ‘green-
field development’ and until recently lacked recourse
to institutions of local urban governance (see Goldstein,
2016), Pune’s suburban fringe areas are already inte-
grated into the city’s thriving local municipal domain—
making its high-tech urban clusters more likely to be sub-
ject to participatory pressures from civic bodies other
than Gurgaon’s.
Figure 1 shows a map of Pune’s land use change pat-
tern from a 2014 study by Nitin Mundhe and Ravindra
Jaybhaye. It depicts the growth of the total built-up
area in the city over the past several decades. The
study asserts that the bulk of this urban growth in the
decade 2001–2011 has happened primarily along the
city’s fringe areas. They attribute this growth mainly to
the swift expansion of IT industry and the service sector
in the city (Mundhe & Jaybhaye, 2014, p. 55). Indeed, it
is in these urban fringe areas that Pune starts to appear
like other megacity fringes, not least, Gurgaon’s—India’s
original ‘technopolis.’
While Pune’s rapid urbanisation trajectory under-
scores the city’s enduring economic growth and its future
potential, it also highlights the coterminous expansion of
new forms of urban inequalities on the city. This is attest-
ed by Pune’s informal slum population, whose growth
has remained consistently higher than the rate of growth
of Pune’s total population over the years. According to
Mundhe (2019), Pune has about 1.2 million people living
in slums; about 40 percent of the city’s population, up
from 8 percent some 50 years ago. The growing dispari-
ties in urban resource distribution have thus also become
starker in the last few decades. Today, this disparity
stands out visually in the form of the distinct verticali-
ty of the glamourous office buildings in the IT parks and
the high-rise, middle-class, residential apartment build-
ings surrounding them,which are contrasted against con-
gested slum settlements of the urban poor, made from
simple brick and mortar, sheet metal and cardboard.
4. Archipelago Economies? High-Tech Cluster and
Urban Co-Dependencies
If one were to go beyond thinking about modern
IT-industry agglomerations in Indian cities as exclusive
archipelago economies (Veltz, 2000) of global digital out-
sourcing, then another visual economy emerges: One
that makes these large IT/ITeS clusters and zones vis-
ible as intense assemblages of local economic and
social activities and logistical labour, whether they
be formal/informal, local/global, material/immaterial or
legal/illegal. Such a view opens our eyes to the impor-
tant and enduring relationship between life and opera-
tions within and outside these high-tech zones, beyond
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Figure 1.Map of urban growth in Pune city from Mundhe and Jaybhaye (2014).
the original moment of their initial separation. As Sassen
(2011, para. 9) elucidates, underlying the growth of
“homogenized landscapes and built environments of the
glamour zone in global cities” of the global South is
the sustenance provided by the primeval economies of
‘the global slums’—small businesses, family enterprises,
informal services and infrastructures—which gives these
spaces certain comparative advantages. Rather than dis-
appearing, these informal urban economies rooted in
place respond and adjust to the operations of these new
global hubs, demonstrating an inherent plasticity towhat
are otherwise considered fragile or vulnerable urban
economic sectors. This scenario becomes amply visible
when one charts the rapid growth of Pune’s IT/ITeS econ-
omy, which, in less than two decades, has created and
produced an uneven urban landscape, while also giv-
ing rise to a recombinant informal economy and work-
force in the city. Different interview participants attest-
ed to this close and co-dependent relationship between
the new formal and informal sector expansion in Pune.
For instance, Kushal Sharma (name changed), the direc-
tor of a transnational ITeS firm, and board member of
an NGO that worked with the city’s municipal corpo-
ration on issues of urban planning and governance in
Pune, explained:
Following the IT/ITeS boom in Pune in the 2000s, pri-
vate sectors realtors started placing bets on land—
buying large tracts in anticipation of future economic
activity. They focussed largely on Pune’s fringe areas—
Hinjewadi, Balewadi, Kharadi, etc. The software tech-
nology park development scheme of the Software
Technology Parks of India, helped by the government,
provided concessions and benefits to the registered
units in these parks at the time. This was the first
phase of transformations of Pune and it was success-
ful in attracting new IT and ITeS sector investment.
Several concessions under the software technology
park scheme were later discontinued. However, this
did not deter real estate investors who had already
got the taste of Pune’s great potential as a new prop-
erty market. They continued expanding, placing bets
on land, not just in low density areas but also high-
er density brownfield locations, incorporating estab-
lished residential and commercial spaces in the city’s
fringes. These were followed quickly by investments
in high-rise residential complexes, shoppingmalls and
other commercial spaces for middle-class profession-
als who came to work in IT-parks and wanted to settle
down near them. Overall, the city [government] gave
little incentive to private real estate players to develop
public spaces and civic structures like bus stops, roads,
streetlights, water supply systems, etc. The outsized
expansion of IT-infrastructure development automat-
ically created the spaces for self-organised urban
communities, and the informal sector to come in,
start operating and serving the needs of the compa-
nies and people here, whether legally or otherwise.
(Kushal Sharma, April 2016)
Ever since its advent in Pune, private speculation-led,
IT-oriented development has become an unlikely source
of growth for informal economies and working classes in
the city. One can commonly observe the constant move-
ment of objects, services, bodies, practices and ideas
between high-tech zones and their outsides, both of
which appear to be tied up in complementary and oppos-
ing logics of everyday collaboration, exchange and juris-
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dictional subversions. Thus, rather than being impene-
trable fortresses of global services production and cir-
culation, the different software technology/knowledge
park clusters in Pune emerge as mutable spaces that
have made possible “various forms of hustling, tapping
into flows or distributive labour that spring up, and in
many cases, dominate, in situations where capital has
done its work of dispossession” (Mezzadra & Neilson,
2019, p. 153).
The intersecting spatialities and temporalities of for-
mal and informal economies become instantly apparent
when one visits the biggest tech parks or IT industrial
zones in the city’s erstwhile fringes of Kharadi, Hinjwadi
or Hadapsar. Here, for instance, one sees that the lack of
dependable and affordable public and private transport
options of last-mile connectivity for the bulk of the work-
force in these spaces (including the mass of low-paid
‘allied serviceworkers’ employed in housekeeping, hospi-
tality and security in these zones) has given rise to a net-
work of undocumented, private vehicles and six-seater
rickshaw drivers who ferry workers back and forth from
these relatively disconnected locations, operating above
regular capacity. The indispensability of these alterna-
tive forms of transport is such that, even after the two
civic authorities—the Pune Municipal Corporation and
the adjoining Pimpri ChinchwadMunicipal Corporation—
have officially banned them on numerous occasions for
public risk after several road mishaps and complaints
of traffic congestion and environmental degradation (air
pollution), they continue to ply their trade commonly in
the city. Indeed, while civil-society activists allege that
the number of these vehicles is 12,000–15,000, for every
legal auto rickshaw, there are four illegal ones (Puri,
2015). The city’s civic and transport authorities, quiet-
ly aware of their indispensability, puts their number at
much lower. More recently, the proliferation of the ‘gig
economy’ in the city, in digital-app-based ride-share ser-
vices has taken some of the load off these ‘unauthorised’
and ‘undocumented’ modes of public transport; howev-
er, they remain important nevertheless because of their
overall affordability to the lower-middle-class and work-
ing poor.
The two-tiered segmentation of the IT-oriented
spaces and labour is further seen in the context of dif-
ferentiated access to basic services for the different
worker classes across most large tech parks in the city.
Thus, for example, many workers do not have access
to affordable, subsidised food inside corporate mess-
es in these IT parks and come to depend on another
more reasonable option—the makeshift roadside food
and tea stalls known locally as Tapri (see Figure 2). These
spring up organically outside the different office cam-
puses and operate round the clock, just like the glob-
al operations that take place inside the IT parks. They,
then, become spaces where workers gather during their
cigarette breaks before, in between or after their dai-
ly work shifts. Here, they discuss workplace politics and
share their routine lives with others. These adjoining
stalls therefore become important spaces where work-
ers can socialise and express themselves more comfort-
Figure 2.Makeshift food and tea stalls (Tapri) outside Eon IT Park in Kharadi. Source: Author.
Urban Planning, 2020, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 371–383 377
ably and openly, without the same fear of constant
techno-bureaucratic surveillance that prevails inside the
IT parks.
In the same vein, the renewed influx of migrant pop-
ulations in Pune looking to take advantage of opportuni-
ties in the booming IT/ITeS economy and the other digi-
tally enabled new services sectors often raises the impor-
tant challenge of affordable housing units for migrants
near these hubs of new economic activities. Here, again,
the demand for affordable housing is matched by the
concomitant growth in ‘unauthorised’ slum settlements
and low-cost neighbourhoods located near these IT/ITeS
clusters. These offer different types of rented accom-
modation and housing arrangements—like shared flats
and tenements for individuals, families and groups and
paying guest accommodations for young workers, along-
side other key amenities, such as food messes and
lunch/dinner delivery services; cybercafes; small, private
computer skills training centres; and English language
learning centres.
Similarly, the lack of publicwater supply for new, high-
rise residential projects in areas adjacent to the large
IT parks in the urban fringes is met by another section
of Pune’s grey or shadow economy. This is known local-
ly as the highly coordinated ‘water tanker mafia,’ which
operates with political and administrative clout and clos-
es the water resource gap for residential, industrial and
construction sites in these areas, until these needs can
be met legally (a process wrapped in bureaucratic red
tape and corruption, which can take several months or
years to resolve). Revealing the close nexus that exists
between the city’s grey economy and the local state, the
water is purchased frommunicipal sources, private wells
or bore wells and/or tapped illegally from civic water sup-
ply points. According to recent reports, the water tanker
mafia in Pune does an annual business of approximately
$13.3 million (100 crore rupees; Bhaskar, 2019).
Resonant with Simone’s (2004, p. 407) analysis in the
context of African cities, the complex formal and infor-
mal spatial networks and assemblages around the var-
ious tech parks in Pune call into question the physical
notions of infrastructure as “reticulated systems of high-
ways, pipes, wires, or cables,” in favour of the alternative
conceptualisation of ‘people as infrastructure.’ These are
defined as the “flexible, mobile, and provisional intersec-
tions of residents that operate without clearly delineat-
ed notions of how the city is to be inhabited and used,
by engaging complex combinations of objects, spaces,
persons, and practices” (Simone, 2004, pp. 407–408).
This movement of people enables the constant osmo-
sis of labour, technologies, practices and ideas between
these global hubs and their ‘ordinary’ outsides. Diverging
to the tropes of expulsion and dispossession associated
with the growth of new infrastructural projects in private
satellite cities such asGurgaon (Kuldova, 2017),what one
observes in Pune’s urban fringes is the formation of inten-
sive and intersecting network of actors, whose nodes
are individuals and communities at the urban margins.
Rather than being net losers of the process of new urban
infrastructural development in the fringe areas, many
of these individuals and communities coalesce around,
adapt to and (even) gain from these changes.
5. The Reconfiguration of Spatial Relations and
Everyday Micro-Politics in Pune’s New Urban Fringes
Recognising the presence of numerous co-dependencies
between different IT industrial clusters and varied forms
of urban formal and informal infrastructures, it becomes
clear that these sites continue to have complex after-
lives following the moment of their original and violent
conception as some form of sovereign spatial entities.
Having said this, it is equally important to keep in
mind that the arbitrary and uneven process of land
development and urban change, triggered by private
investors hedging bets in different areas of the city, is
not automatically geared towards creating collaborative
urban spaces; rather, these become collaborative over
time to meet the needs of diverse local communities
and actors, whether they be elite or subaltern. These
spaces harbour potential for coalitions, but also con-
testations and counter-claim-making between multiple
actors in the transforming urban context. These new
spaces and economies produce broad-based reconfigu-
ration of social and spatial relations and politics in the
city, inflected by classed and communitarian positionali-
ties of its actors. This is to say that, contrary to the pro-
jected binaries between the ‘powerful’ capitalist class-
es and the ‘powerless’ agrarian classes, or between the
neoliberal ‘extractive’ state and the ‘compliant ‘subal-
tern, what emerges is a more diffused urban assem-
blage consisting of diverse social actors, social infrastruc-
tures and services, entwined in differing logics of spa-
tial cooperation and contestation. While territorial con-
flicts between groups with different class and caste back-
grounds is not the central focus of this article, to under-
stand the changing everyday social relations and micro-
politics that arise in the wake of large-scale IT infras-
tructure development projects, it becomes imperative to
grasp the heterogeneity of urban actors and their inter-
relationships in the local context. Broadly, my research
confirmed the important role of specific actors and inter-
est groups that co-shape urban realities every day. These
include: private real estate or public sector land devel-
opers; the elite and newly rich middle-classes; tradition-
al land-owning communities; local political representa-
tives, such as the Municipal Corporators and members
of legislative assembly; lower-middle-classes; and urban,
slum-dwelling communities, including settled and new
migrants to the city.
State authorities like the Maharashtra Industrial
Development and large private developers, such as the
Pancshil Group, were some of the original investors in
Pune’s IT-oriented infrastructure developments. Today,
new private-sector developers have together built large
IT hubs and new business districts in the city’s ‘new’
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urban fringes of Hinjewadi, Kharadi and Hadapsar. The
initial developments have also triggered some essential
infrastructural investment developments by smaller, pri-
vate real estate developers in the new urban fringes.
Land deals in these new areas are now increasingly nego-
tiated by private developers directly with local land and
property owners. Thus, rather than being completely
state sponsored, much of the land around these large
IT hubs has become a scattered collection of hundreds
of large, small and mid-sized private commercial com-
plexes and gated residential enclaves, with some tracts
of undeveloped, vacant agricultural lands still visible in
their midst. Certain land-owning communities in the city
have become enriched from this process of private land
development, even becoming real estate investors and
developers themselves, using their local community and
political clout.
The popular example of Magarpatta city in eastern
Pune is often cited as a successful cooperative venture.
It is a 450-acre, self-contained, eco-friendly, hybrid town-
ship with 30 percent green spaces, large, modern office
buildings, residential blocks, hospitals, schools and shop-
ping malls (see Chatterji, 2015; Kantakumar, Kumar, &
Schneider, 2016). Here, farmers from the Magar com-
munity came together as politically influential agricul-
tural landowners and subsequently became co-owners
and developers of their own land, leasing it out to some
of the biggest multinational corporations and earning
huge profits (Chatterji, 2015; Sami, 2013). However, while
Magarpatta city has come to be highlighted as a suc-
cessful, more participatory and fair model of new urban
infrastructural development for the country, this has not
been replicated widely, even inside Pune, revealing the
different configurations of local political cultures that con-
tinue to shape differential outcomes for different urban
actors.Moreover,Magarpatta city’s success also obscures
from view the broader issues of planning that its even-
tual residents, its users and adjoining neighbourhoods
continue to face every day. Thus, for instance, frequent
traffic jams on the narrow public roads leading up to
Magarpatta city are a significant source of frustration for
the local populations, who travel to Magarpatta for work,
reside in the area, or simply pass through it every day.
Another set of actors who have assumed great impor-
tance in the everyday politics of new spatial develop-
ments in suburban Pune, is the city’s higher-earners and
more affluent ‘new middle-classes’ (cf. Platz, 2012), that
invest in the new residential and commercial projects
that sprout around the different IT/ITeS clusters. It is com-
mon to see in Pune, numerous billboards with aspira-
tional advertising, promising quick ownership of a high-
end modern luxury apartment for upper-middle-class
families through loans at low interest rates and easy
instalments. Indeed, most IT professionals who I inter-
viewed in Pune, either already owned (at least) one
home in a multi-storey ‘housing society’ in these ‘new’
areas, rented there, or else aspired to own one in the
future. The emergence of this new middle-class orient-
ed urban development projects in Pune’s suburbs, fur-
ther fuelled by the growing penetration of speculative
real estate capital in the city, has subsequently given rise
to new expressions of middle-class aspirational politics
in the city. The usual vehicles of this politics are usual-
ly civil society groups and residential associations, which
seek to address the numerous gaps in local infrastructure
and planning in these ‘up-and-coming’ areas of the city—
whether they be related to the environment, transport,
water, lighting, traffic or road development (cf. Menon &
Hartz-Karp, 2019). Many of these middle-class civil soci-
ety groups are well-networked and media savvy, and use
their visibility in the public sphere to intervene in and
change the course of urban and area development plans,
engaging with the state and civic authorities, as well as
the private sector developers and companies.
However, Harriss (2005) and Lemanski and Tawa
Lama-Rewal (2012) note new middle-class activism in
India, in many cases, puts them on a collision course
with those who operate the city’s informal economy and
provide crucial human infrastructural support, namely
the lower-middle classes and urban poor communities.
In Pune, a similar scenario can be observed. Several
middle-class collectives here have regularly protested
and advocated for implementing stricter bans on unau-
thorised, six-seater auto-rickshaws and unauthorised pri-
vate vehicles on the roads near the different IT clus-
ters, with the aim of reducing congestion and accidents,
while alsomitigating the rising air pollution in these ‘new’
areas (see Puri, 2015). In their claims for better roads
and traffic management, however, it is the ‘illegal’ trans-
port economy and its most common users—the infor-
mal working classes that often gets the most blame for
causing traffic snarls and road accidents in these areas,
even when they are themore likely to be at the receiving
end of these problems. This, then, has major repercus-
sions for the needs and legitimacy of the informal work-
ing classes, who depend on these alternatives modes of
transport to access and serve the same affluent spaces
and middle-class communities. That said, it is important
to remember that the relative power of urban elites and
new middle-class groups does not indicate the perma-
nency of (their) territorial antagonisms towards non-elite
or subaltern groups in the city, since such a binary can
easily hide from view the heterogeneity that exists with-
in the middle-classes in new suburban spaces in India,
and obscure the different instances of intra- and cross-
class dependence and their alliances on provision of pub-
lic services and infrastructures (see Lemanski & Tawa
Lama-Rewal, 2012). Indeed, one could also argue that
while poor road infrastructure and lack of proper trans-
port planning in the new urban fringes of Pune under-
lines the large neglect by city authorities of these ‘new’
areas, the resolution of these problems often happens
only after new spatial conflicts make these an issue.
The city’s informal working classes and urban poor,
while cut-off from the more prominent civil society net-
works, assert their importance by other means. They
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rely on their indispensable role as organic lubricators
of the city’s new IT-oriented infrastructural spaces and
their participation in the ‘political society’—that is, new
forms of urban governmentality which includes grass-
roots communitarian and civic associations, and the elec-
tions of urban, local bodies, such as for the municipal
corporation (see Menon & Hartz-Karp, 2019). There is a
visible heterogeneity among actors and interest groups
within the informal economy and communities as well,
which defines how and to what extent they engage in
urban spatial politics. For instance, in unauthorised slum
settlements adjoining new sites of private IT infrastruc-
ture investments in the city’s urban fringes, there can
be found two categories of migrant populations—recent
migrants and settled migrants. While new migrants in
these slums looking to access affordable accommodation
and sustainable employment in the city do not common-
ly engage in municipal politics, settled and intergenera-
tional migrant communities see the rise in land prices
and private developments around them as an opportuni-
ty to collectively demand and push for regularisation and
(re)development of their slum settlements from state
authorities andmunicipal representatives in their respec-
tive prabhag, or municipal ward. Slum regularisation is
an important demand of its residents, as it enables these
communities to access better civic and infrastructural
facilities and entitles them to become recognised proper-
ty holders, landlords, rentiers and consumers of private
services, such as new Internet and mobile communica-
tion infrastructures—services that are present in other
regularised slums and in the city at large.
The ‘municipal corporators,’ representing the differ-
ent wards in the city’s new urban fringes with large
growth in IT-oriented infrastructure, often come from
powerful landowning and farming communities in the
city. They can help accelerate, slow down or even block
new private infrastructural developments in these areas,
often based on their own political interests and/or asso-
ciated economic motivations. The case of the proposed
17km Kharadi–Shiavane road on the eastern fringes of
Pune is an example. The construction of this road has
been ‘pending’ for over 11 years, following issues relat-
ed to proper compensation to farmer communities who
own the land by the state and the municipal corpo-
ration. The farmers have been supported in this by
the municipal corporator in Kharadi, a local agricultural
landowner himself (Kulkarni, 2020a). In a later instance,
however, the same corporator supported a group of
protesting middle-class IT workers against the inaugura-
tion of a vacant land space for a weekly farmers’ mar-
ket by the sitting member of legislative assembly from
an opposing political party near their residential apart-
ments (Kulkarni, 2020b). This contrasting posturing by
the local municipal representative in different instances
provides an insight into the ways in which class- and
community-based antagonisms are suspended or super-
seded in favour of pluralist or pragmatic everyday territo-
rial negotiations, engrained in the local political culture.
It is in suchways that everydaymicropolitics continues to
shape the typologies and the temporalities of local land
use, urban planning and development that takes place in
and around various IT/ITeS clusters and zones.
6. Conclusion
Recent digital transformations in the economies of coun-
tries in the global South have affected not just a phys-
ical change in the urban and infrastructural landscapes
of cities and their peripheries, but also provoked a
profound social reconfiguration within them. As every-
day life in the global South is disrupted by these new
socio-spatial transformations, there is scope to expand
further the digital geographies agenda to include its
engagement with uneven urban development and plan-
ning in different postcolonial contexts.
This article, rooted in extensive ethnographic
research carried out in the city of Pune, has explored the
progression of IT-oriented infrastructural developments
that have come to define themost recent phase of urban-
isation in many metropolitan cities across India. The arti-
cle contributes in different ways to existing scholarship
on urban digital geographies from the standpoint of con-
temporary southern urbanisms, excavating the complex
relationship between contemporary digital transforma-
tions in the economy and nature of new suburban expan-
sion in the global South. First, the article has interrogat-
ed the conceptual blind spots that exist within contem-
porary research on global urbanisms that overempha-
sise the rural–urban divide and related class binaries, in
context of large-scale development of IT/ITeS-oriented
infrastructures in India’s megacity fringes. This article
has, instead, emphasised the need to explore the com-
plex ‘afterlives’ of these new infrastructural spaces in the
global South, integrating the different intersecting expe-
riences of heterogeneous economic actors, infrastruc-
tures and communities that surround these emergent
spaces, and shape their futures.
Additionally, countering popular tropes that identi-
fy large IT/ITeS-oriented infrastructural spaces as closed
and impenetrable archipelago economies, this article
has argued for understanding these sites in the glob-
al South, as porous and co-constituted by their ordi-
nary ‘outsides.’ The article evidences this argument by
highlighting how the growth in speculative investments
led by the private sector in Pune has also opened new
avenues for the expansion of informal economies and
infrastructures in the city, which include, amongst oth-
er things, provisional and illegal modes of public trans-
port, informal and affordablemeans of housing, food and
water. Over time, these informal and grey economies
have become a huge and indispensable part of the city’s
fabric, revealing important urban co-dependencies that
are integral to the sustenance, growth and transforma-
tion of these new infrastructural spaces.
Finally, this article has explored the ways in which
high-tech development redefines the landscape of urban
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micro-politics in India, but also how it gets re-configured
(both) by the different territorial contestations and by
pragmatic collaborations between different elite and
subalterns groups at the local level. Identifying some of
the key economic, civic and political actors involved in
such spatial negotiations in Pune city, the article shows
how the fluid nature of everydaymicro-politics surround-
ing these high-tech global infrastructural spaces may cre-
ate new forms of urban governmentality and public par-
ticipation in cities of the global South.
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